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Persistent Policy Effects on the Division of Domestic Tasks 
in Reunified Germany 
We are only beginning to unravel the mechanisms by which the division of domestic 
tasks varies in its sociopolitical context. Selecting couples from the German SocioEconomic 
Panel that married between 1990 and 1995 in the former East and West regions of Germany 
and following them until 2000 (N = 348 couples), I find evidence of direct, interaction, and 
contextual effects predicting husbands’ hours in and share of household tasks, but not 
childcare. East German men perform a greater share of household tasks than West German 
men after controlling for individual attributes and regional factors. Childcare remains more 
gendered, and the first child’s age proves the most important predictor of fathers’ 
involvement. These findings further our understanding of how the state shapes gender equity 
in the home. 
Key words: cross-national comparative; division of labor; housework; longitudinal analysis 
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Persistent Policy Effects on the Division of Domestic Tasks 
in Reunified Germany 
The private sphere of the household nests within broader sociopolitical institutions, 
but only recently have analyses compared the division of domestic tasks across countries. 
Earlier analyses found no cross-country differences in men’s domestic share once controlling 
for individual variables (Baxter, 1997; Kalleberg & Rosenfeld, 1990). More recent analyses 
found not only modest cross-national variation (Batalova & Cohen, 2002; Davis & 
Greenstein, 2004), but also interaction effects between individual variables and contextual 
measures attributable to the policy environment (Fuwa, 2004; Geist, 2005; Hook, 2006). This 
evidence suggests policies not only alter women’s level of individual resources, but also 
women’s aggregate level of these resources alters the effect of individual resources on couple 
negotiations. Breen and Cooke (2005) argue this occurs because the larger the proportion of 
economically autonomous women in a society, the more likely men as a group will believe 
and act upon the belief that more sharing of domestic tasks is necessary for successful 
marriages. 
These studies, however, share similar limitations. All are based on cross-sectional 
data, whereas women’s time in paid and unpaid labor varies across union status as well as the 
marital life course, making panel data more suitable (Gupta, 1999; Kalleberg & Rosenfeld, 
1990). Cross-sectional data also exclude information from couples divorcing prior to the year 
of survey, potentially overlooking information on almost half of the first-married population. 
The surveys all use a single respondent for information about the entire household, with 
results varying with the gender of the respondent. Many studies show women and men 
overestimate their own domestic hours (Coltrane, 2000) and Lee (2005) finds that women 
might underestimate men’s. Consequently, greater accuracy comes from getting information 
from each person in a couple, particularly when comparing relative shares. The studies also 
only compare the division of household tasks, which might include some care activities, but 
none compares couple negotiation of childcare with other domestic tasks. Finally, although 
some use statistical techniques to account for unmeasured national differences (Batalova & 
Cohen, 2003; Fuwa, 2004; Hook, 2006), these cannot differentiate between policy and 
cultural effects. 
Here I extend our understanding of policy effects on the household division of labor 
by using better data, employing a natural country experiment to differentiate policy from 
unmeasured cultural effects, comparing the husbands’ hours in and share of household tasks 
4 
as well as childcare, and examining the persistence of policy effects on gender relations after 
the policies themselves have changed. I use the longitudinal German SocioEconomic Panel 
data to compare first-married couples’ divisions of household tasks and childcare across the 
former East and West Germany during the 1990s. These two regions provide a natural 
experiment for differentiating between cultural and policy effects because they are comprised 
of people who shared a common cultural past but were nondemocratically subjected to 
radically different policies after World War II. West Germany put in place policies 
supporting women’s responsibility for the home and her economic reliance on a male 
breadwinner whereas East Germany adopted a Stalinist constitution expecting and supporting 
women’s employment with a web of public services and related policies. Time diary data 
from the 1960s reveal the division of domestic tasks more egalitarian in all socialist countries 
at that time, and in East Germany as compared with West Germany (Hook, 2006). 
Now the two regions are reunified under the West German state. If what matters is the 
immediate policy context, the division of domestic tasks should now be similar across the 
regions, varying only in the degree to which previous policy may have altered individual 
levels of relative resources such as educational attainment (Baxter, 1997). To the extent the 
divergent policy paths fundamentally rather than temporally alter relative gender power as 
argued by Breen and Cooke, then a more egalitarian division of domestic tasks should remain 
among East couples once controlling for individual resources. As East Germany provided 
state support for the care of children and regional differences in this persist, the household 
division of childcare is also compared across the two regions. Ascertaining whether effects 
prevail under a shifting policy environment provides an important extension to our 
understanding of how the state shapes, rather than simply reflects, societal gender relations. 
PREDICTING THE DIVISION OF DOMESTIC LABOR 
Relative power or resources, time availability, and the gender perspective dominate 
analyses of the household division of labor. Time availability and relative resource models 
predict women’s rising employment should have led to a revolution in the domestic roles of 
women and men. Most empirical evidence from the United States suggests that relative 
resources predict some shift in the division of household tasks, but not enough to indicate an 
even exchange of paid for unpaid work (Goldscheider & Waite, 1991; Shelton & John, 1996). 
As to time availability, men’s domestic hours across industrialized countries increased 
modestly since 1960, but not sufficiently to countermand women’s increase in work hours 
(Bianchi et al., 2000; Gershuny, 2000; Sullivan, 2006). U.S. men assume more tasks if they 
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work different shifts from their wives (Presser, 1994), but in many countries the observed 
increase in men’s share of domestic tasks over the past 40 years results from women’s 
reduction in their own housework (Bianchi et al., 2000; Sullivan, 2006). 
So the revolution in the gendered division of domestic tasks predicted by women’s 
rising employment failed to occur. Controlling for employment or earnings, U.S. women 
increase their housework hours when partnered with a man whereas men decrease their hours 
when partnered with a woman, with the change most acute when children are present (Gupta, 
1999; South & Spitze, 1994). Evidence from Australia (Bittman et al., 2003) and the United 
States (Brines, 1994; Fenstermaker Berk, 1985; Greenstein, 2000; Hochschild, 1989) also 
reveals that as a woman’s earnings exceed those of the man, she takes on a greater rather than 
lesser share of housework as predicted by relative resource or time availability models. These 
dynamics support the gender perspective: A gendered division of labor does not reflect 
simple exchanges of relative resources or time, but is a symbolic expression of gender 
difference that produces and reproduces gender hierarchies (Fenstermaker Berk, 1985; Ferree, 
1990; West & Zimmerman, 1987). These gendered hierarchies vary in context and across 
countries, reflecting gender regimes (Connell, 1987) or cultures (Pfau-Effinger, 1998). 
Only recently have studies explicitly compared how the gendered division of labor at 
the family level varies with the sociopolitical structure in which it is negotiated. The earliest 
comparative work reported little cross-country variation in either the gendered division of 
housework or the effects of relative resources, time availability, and gender ideology on 
altering it (Baxter, 1997, comparing Australia, Canada, Norway, Sweden, and the United 
States; Kalleberg & Rosenfeld, 1990, comparing Canada, Norway, Sweden, and the United 
States). Baxter (1997) concluded that any gains in gender equality in the home would result 
from women’s greater access to individual resources. 
In contrast, Davis and Greenstein (2004) used data from 13 advanced industrial as 
well as transitional economies in the International Social Justice Project and found that after 
controlling for individual attributes, indicator variables for each of the countries predicted 
statistically significant variation in the division of household tasks such as cooking, laundry, 
and cleaning. More egalitarian divisions occurred in some, but not all, of the former socialist 
countries and the most gendered division in Japan. They offer that the contradictory results 
for the former socialist countries might reflect the degree to which citizens responded to 
political change by reinforcing gender stereotypes in the home, but they did not speculate why 
this might occur in only some of these countries. 
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Using the United Nations’ Gender Empowerment Measure, 22 industrial and 
transitional countries in the 1994 International Social Survey Program, and hierarchical linear 
modeling, Batalova and Cohen (2002) and Fuwa (2004) found that the Gender Empowerment 
Measure predicted systematic differences in the division of female household tasks once 
controlling for individual variables. The Gender Empowerment Measure captures the percent 
of parliamentary seats held by women; the percent of women in administrative, managerial, 
and professional or technical positions; and women’s share of earnings income, factors 
directly attributable to the gendered extent of national policy regimes (Orloff, 1993). In all 
countries, women retained primary responsibility for laundry, shopping, deciding what to 
have for dinner, and tending to sick family members. Batalova and Cohen found that couples’ 
premarital cohabitation predicted a more egalitarian division of these tasks. Once controlling 
for this individual-level experience, a country’s overall cohabitation rate and the Gender 
Empowerment Measure also predicted the division of household tasks within married couples. 
Yet again, inconsistencies emerge. Eastern European countries with high historical 
cohabitation rates did not have as egalitarian divisions of household tasks as these rates 
should predict. 
Using the same data and technique, Fuwa (2004) found interaction effects between the 
Gender Empowerment Measure and individual resources. Time availability and gender 
ideology effects proved stronger or weaker for women in more versus less egalitarian 
countries, respectively, although the substantive differences were quite modest and 
inconsistencies persisted. With most former socialist regimes, time availability had weaker 
effects than predicted by their Gender Empowerment Measure, whereas liberal regimes such 
as Britain and Australia showed stronger effects of wives’ full-time employment than that 
measure would predict. Fuwa offered no explanation for these inconsistencies. Geist (2005) 
also used the 1994 International Social Survey Program data but analyzed 10 more advanced 
industrialized societies to find ideology effects weaker whereas time availability effects were 
stronger in corporatist-conservative welfare regimes such as Germany. 
Hook (2006) claims policies supporting female employment shift the benefits of 
specialization. Using a hierarchical linear model and time diary data from 20 countries over 
several decades and controlling for the percentage of married women employed, women’s 
work hours, public childcare slots for infants, and weeks of parental leave, she found 
women’s greater aggregate employment rate predicts men’s greater time in domestic tasks 
regardless of an individual woman’s employment. Breen and Cooke (2005) argue where 
policies enhance women’s economic autonomy, the proportion of women desiring a gendered 
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division of labor declines to the point that men believe any female partner will expect a more 
egalitarian division of domestic tasks. What is necessary to observe greater gender equality is 
that the proportion of economically autonomous women must be sufficiently high to change 
men’s beliefs about what a partner would expect in the domestic sphere, and his willingness 
to act on those beliefs so that we evolve away from separate spheres. Such a general shift is 
reflected in Hook’s results for countries with high female labor force participation. 
As noted, however, the studies to date share common limitations. All use cross-
sectional data with a sole household respondent, which fail to capture the dynamic nature of 
couple negotiations (Gupta, 1999; Kalleberg & Rosenfeld, 1990). For any given couple, 
employment, earnings, and time in domestic tasks vary across the marital life course as 
partners accrue work experience, move, lose a job, have children, and so on. Using 
longitudinal data enables us to control for the effects of such changes in any given time period 
on the division of housework or childcare, although trying to assess the specific influence of 
change in each in any given marital year would quickly prove unwieldy. 
Taking a cross-sectional sample also yields a biased sample of still-married couples. In 
an analysis of 188 societies, Fisher (1993) finds that the maximum risk of divorce consistently 
occurs two to four years after marriage. The studies above do not report average marriage 
duration, but in one married sample drawn from the National Survey of Families and 
Households, the average marriage duration was 17 years (Greenstein, 2000: p. 327), whereas 
in 1990, the median U.S. first marriage duration was approximately 8 years (National Center 
for Health Statistics, 1995). In a cross-section of married European couples drawn from the 
1994 European Community Household Panel, the author found the average marriage duration 
ranged from 11 years in Great Britain to 18 years in Italy. So cross-sectional results provide 
insight into bargaining dynamics among only a fraction of all first-married couples. 
The comparative studies above focused as well on the division of domestic tasks, at 
times including some child-related care in a combined measure (Batalova & Cohen, 2002; 
Fuwa, 2004; Hook, 2006). Thus we have no direct evidence of variation in the factors 
affecting the division of care as compared with other domestic tasks. Bargaining models 
assume household tasks are unpleasant activities that individuals wish to avoid, whereas this 
assumption proves untenable when tasks are displays of love and caring (Ferree, 1990). In a 
recent overview of U.S. time diary data from the 1960s to the late 1990s, Sayer (2005) finds 
that across the time period women have reduced and men have increased their hours in 
housework while both have increased their time in childcare. Further, a key family policy 
variant across countries is the extent to which it relies on women’s unpaid care work or 
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provides support for maternal employment, both of which affect the time in childcare either 
parent might spend. Consequently, controlling for the availability of public childcare for very 
young children demanding the most parental time is important to our understanding of policy 
effects on the gendered division of labor. 
Conceptually, a much broader range of policies shapes gender relations within a 
country. Cooke (2007) extends Orloff’s (1993) dimensions for analyzing gender effects 
within welfare regimes to detail how education, labor, tax, and social insurance policies, along 
with family law, alter women’s relative power in household bargaining. Labor laws directly 
affect women’s access to paid work and the relative wages earned. Education policies affect 
women’s relative power by the degree to which they might pursue careers on a par with men. 
The structure of public compulsory education systems also inhibits women’s ability to 
participate in the labor force if there is little provision of childcare before public schooling 
starts, or if the scheduling of public schooling includes breaks during the week or long 
vacations between school terms (Gornick, Meyers, & Ross, 1997). 
Education and labor laws affect all types of couples, whereas many tax and family 
laws and social policies differentiate between legally married and other couples. Higher 
marginal tax rates, where a second earner’s income gets taxed at a higher percentage, 
discourage female employment among married couples, particularly high-earning married 
couples (Jaumotte, 2003). Tax credits for dependent spouses also discourage married 
women’s employment, again more markedly among higher earners if calculated as a 
percentage of income rather than at a flat rate. Paternity leave encourages greater sharing of 
childcare, but extensive maternity leave and policies encouraging part-time employment 
reinforce a gendered division of labor (Hook, 2006; Jaumotte, 2003). 
Benefit entitlement such as unemployment or health insurance and family leave can be 
based on either individual contributions, which encourages dual-earners, or household 
income, which tends to reinforce a male breadwinner model. Yet the household test does not 
necessarily apply to cohabiting couples as it would for married couples, and cohabiting 
couples at times deny their coresidency in order to continue to qualify for benefits as single 
heads of household. Family law affects women’s rights in the event of marital dissolution and 
her alternatives to a given relationship and, in turn, her relative power under social exchange 
parameters (Blau, 1960). In many countries such as the U.S., contract rather than family law 
covers cohabiting couples, so their rights in this regard vary as well (Kamerman & Kahn, 
1997). 
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It proves impossible to capture all of these elements affecting couples in a great 
number of countries with three or four policy variables and even the most advanced statistical 
techniques, so from time to time a more detailed comparison of fewer well chosen cases is in 
order. Here I extend the comparative findings by using the longitudinal German 
SocioEconomic Panel to compare first-married couples’ division of domestic tasks and 
childcare during the early years of their marriage across the former East and West Germany. 
As detailed next, young Germans marrying during the 1990s grew up under two different 
policy structures that varied their reinforcement of separate spheres, but now both negotiate 
the household division of labor under the West German state. This analysis not only allows us 
to see how different policies affect the division of household tasks and childcare, but whether 
policy effects enhancing women’s economic autonomy persist after the specific policy 
provisions cease. 
EAST AND WEST GERMANY: A NATURAL POLICY EXPERIMENT 
Although arguably coming from a common cultural heritage, the two German regions 
also exhibited nonpolitical differences before and after World War II much as we might 
observe across U.S. states. There was a greater prevalence of Protestantism and living in rural 
communities in the East Länder and more Catholics and urban dwellers in the West, but there 
is variation in these aspects within each region as well as across them and they evolve over 
time (Bertram, 1996). In contrast, a substantial political divide was immediately and 
externally imposed after the War. In 1949, five Länder were formed into East Germany, or 
the German Democratic Republic, under Soviet occupation, whereas the remaining Länder 
formed West Germany, or the Federal Republic of Germany, under British, French, and U.S. 
occupation. East Germany was forced to constitute a new government following the socialist 
model of Stalinist Russia, whereas Allies required that a new West German constitution 
containing no vestiges of either the Third Reich or socialism (Moeller, 1993, 1997). 
West German Policy: 1949 - 1990 
The Allies identified the Catholic Church as an institution that had not succumbed to 
the Nazi dictatorship, so conservative West German politicians successfully argued that the 
new political system be founded on the pater familias supported by the Church (Gerhard, 
1992; Moeller, 1993; Ostner, 1992; Zimmerman, 1993). Child allowances (Kindergeld) were 
introduced in 1954 and payable to wage earners with three or more children. Although 
female heads of households—in the early 1950s, nearly five million out of West Germany’s 
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15 million households were headed by divorcees or widows—were eligible for these 
allowances, only 13% of single mothers qualified (Moeller, 1997). Taxation systems and 
rebates benefited high-income, single-earner families. The public health insurance scheme 
also favored single-earner families, as contributions were based on a percentage of income for 
each adult earner, not on family size, so that partners not employed and children could be 
insured at no extra cost whereas dual-earner couples paid a percentage on each income (Hohn, 
1990). 
Mothers were deemed the only satisfactory educators of their children, so school 
schedules varied from day to day and children were expected to return home for lunch 
(Ostner, 1993; von Oertzen, 1999). A report published in 1966 highlighted gender disparities 
in educational attainment and concluded that women were failing to exploit fully their right of 
education, contrary to the interests of society in terms of educating the next generation (von 
Oertzen, 1999). Until the 1970s, West German women tended to leave the educational system 
earlier than men, although fewer women than men had no degree. 
The child rebates favoring higher-income households were discontinued in 1975 and 
replaced by a more generous system of child allowances. During this period, the government 
also acknowledged the existence of nontraditional families. It was no longer illegal to rent 
rooms to unmarried couples and the legal positions of single mothers and illegitimate children 
were defined and strengthened in 1970 (Ostner, 1992; Zimmerman, 1993). Yet unmarried 
couples still pay higher taxes, have no right to be heir to each other, and the biological father 
has no right to custody of the children, suggesting very different household factors affect 
cohabiting as compared with legally married couples (Kolbe, 1999). Consequently, out-of­
wedlock births under the West German state make women more economically vulnerable than 
either divorced or widowed women (Ostner, 1993). 
During the 1980s, a conservative government reinstated several advantages for male 
breadwinner families, including tax rebates, a new childrearing leave targeted toward women, 
and the baby year pension credit of one year per child for women born after 1921 (Hohn, 
1990; Ostner, 1993; Zimmerman, 1993). These provisions encouraged women to exit the 
labor market during the period of high general unemployment Germany began to experience 
in the early 1980s, which both reinforced West German men’s priority claim to employment 
and women’s domestic roles and reliance on a male breadwinner. 
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East German Policy: 1949 - 1990

The Stalinist constitution adopted by East Germany in 1949 enforced not just 
women’s right but also obligation to work (Budde, 1999; Moeller, 1993; Trappe, 2000). In 
1950, the marriage and family law regulations that had been a legacy of the German Civil 
Code were abolished (Ostner, 1992). In contrast to West Germany, the East German state 
mandated developing the skill credentials of women through education and vocational training 
(Budde, 1999), although most women selected from among 16 training programs in traditional 
female occupations out of almost 200 possible vocations open to them (Nickel, 1992). A 
larger proportion of East German women attended professional colleges and university than in 
West Germany (Tons & Young, 2001). 
The 1950 Mother and Child Care and Women’s Rights Acts established a range of 
social services in support of full female employment, including plans for a network of public 
childcare centers, kindergartens, and facilities for free school meals; maternity leave for five 
weeks before and six weeks after delivery at 100% of their take-home earnings; and days off 
to tend sick children (Ostner, 1993; Zimmerman, 1993). Between 1966 and 1972, specific 
policies included expansion of childcare facilities, childbirth subsidies, extension of paid 
maternity leave to 18 weeks, and easier access to housing and pension credits for motherhood 
years (Gerhard, 1992; Münz & Ulrich, 1995; Trappe, 2000; Zimmerman, 1993). Between 
1972 and 1989, maternity leave was extended to 20 weeks, additional financial support for 
second children was introduced, and child and health care services were expanded 
(Zimmerman, 1993). 
By the time of reunification in 1990, over 90% of married women in the former East 
Germany were employed (a figure including those on maternity leave), more than two thirds 
full-time. In contrast, just 44% of married women in the West were employed and only half of 
these employed full time (Ostner, 1993). The West German rate is very similar to the 
historical employment rate for married women in all of Germany up until World War II 
(Bock, 1991). Although East German women’s educational attainment and employment 
participation nearly equaled that of men, the East German pronatalist policies still assigned 
women responsibility for the domestic sphere, so maternity leaves, missed days caring for sick 
children, etcetera, were costs of female employees (Nickel, 1992). As a result, women were 
viewed as less productive than male employees and were denied key on-the-job training and 
promotions (Einhorn, 1993; Ferree, 1992). The centralized wage setting in socialist East 
Germany did nothing to rectify gender wage differentials (Sorensen & Trappe, 1995). 
Consequently, the net wages of East German women working full time were 76% of men’s 
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(Nickel, 1992), as compared with 65% for West German women working full-time (Frevert, 
1989; Gornick, 1999). 
East German policy also failed to promote men’s participation in domestic work. The 
1965 Familiengesetzbuch called for a new male consciousness, but no policies were 
implemented to encourage it. The continuing gender differences in the division of paid and 
unpaid labor in the home led to the 1989 founding of the Unabhaengiger Frauenverband to 
organize autonomous women’s groups and be a voice in policy making, demanding the 
establishment of women’s equality offices and lobbying for full employment, reduced paid 
work hours, and increased benefits for childrearing for both men and women (Ferree, 1992). 
The difference in women’s relative resources, however, still yielded a more although 
not fully egalitarian division of domestic labor in East Germany as compared with West 
Germany prior to unification. Analyses of time diary data from the 1960s reveal East German 
men performed an average of 126 minutes per day in all domestic tasks (including 18 minutes 
in childcare), as compared with 92 minutes (including 10 minutes in childcare) for West 
German men (Hook, 2006, p. 645). A 1991 time-budget study by the Federal Statistical 
Office found a similar regional difference shortly after reunification, with the ratio of women 
to men’s time in housework 2.4 to 1 in the West and 1.8 to 1 in the East (Rosenfeld, Trappe, 
& Gornick, 2004). But many East German women’s policy advantages fell with the Berlin 
Wall. 
Reunified Germany 
Following reunification, the West German policy structure applied to East Germany. 
Many childcare centers were closed, although the supply of public childcare still remains 
substantially higher in the East (Wrohlich, 2005). In 1991, East German firms privatized by 
the Treuhand granted only 3,400 of 20,800 vocational training places to girls (Ostner, 1993), 
and fewer than one in four new jobs went to women (Gerhard, 1992). Shifting to a market 
economy also resulted in severe economic dislocation, with unemployment disproportionately 
high among women so that during the decade, women’s employment levels in the two regions 
converged (Gerhard, 1992; Rosenfeld et al., 2004). 
Despite these changes, East German women exhibit a stubbornness (Eigensinn) in 
retaining what Adler (2004, p. 1171) terms “the German Democratic Republic standard 
biography.” As of 1994, East German women and men reported less ideological support for a 
male breadwinner model than West Germans (Breen & Cooke, 2005). Preliminary analysis of 
the 2002 International Social Survey Program by the author suggests that the East German 
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ideology persists among women, but East German men now report slightly greater support for 
separate spheres than they did in 1994. 
This persistence of women’s ideology despite reunification under a common state is 
consistent with Therborn’s (1980) notion that ideology is shaped over time by historical 
material relations. A necessary antecedent to a new social order is the ability to conceive that 
another way is possible and just. The policies implemented in East Germany after World War 
II enabled East German women to conceive of an alternative way of dividing paid labor, 
although the subsequent pronatalist policies in turn reinforced women’s responsibility for 
childrearing, East women had already conceived of a more just way and feminist activism 
within the country accelerated despite extensive structural barriers (Ferree, 1993). Not until 
second wave feminism of the 1970s and 1980s did West German women begin to gain policy 
support in new possibilities for the organization of productive tasks (Tons & Young, 2001). 
At the time of unification, West German young adults had formed their expectations 
regarding life and relationships under policies supporting separate spheres of a male 
breadwinner model, whereas East German young adults formed expectations under policies 
supporting women’s full time employment. If material relations over time shape gender 
relations in the private sphere as suggested by both Breen and Cooke (2005) and Therborn 
(1980), then regardless of East German women’s actual educational attainment, work hours, 
or wages under reunified Germany, East couples should display more egalitarian divisions of 
domestic tasks. Analyzed next are to what extent these direct and contextual effects predict 
the postunification division of household tasks and childcare among East and West German 
first-married couples. 
In addition to individual education and employment-related resources, women’s age, 
number and ages of children, couples’ cohabitation history, and marital duration also affect 
men’s hours or share in housework (Batalova & Cohen, 2002; Coltrane, 2000). At the 
contextual level, Fuwa (2004) and Hook (2006) found that aggregate female employment 
rates influenced housework divisions. Brines (1994) found that U.S. men’s unemployment 
resulted in evidence of gender display, so a higher rate of general unemployment might 
increase evidence of this in terms of the household division of domestic tasks once controlling 
for men’s and women’s individual work hours. The availability of public childcare in the 
Länder remains one persistent policy difference that encourages female employment and 
reduces the total number of caring hours to be shared within a couple. 
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METHOD 
Data and Sample 
The division of German household tasks and childcare are analyzed using data from 
the 1990 to 2000 waves of the German SocioEconomic Panel. The panel is a longitudinal 
study of private German households where each member over the age of 16 is interviewed 
annually. It began in 1984 with a representative sample of 12,290 people in 5,921 (out of 
7,979 contacted or 74%) West German households. Sampling extended into the former East 
in June 1990, covering 4,453 persons in 2,179 (out of 3,114 contacted or 70%) households. 
As of the 2000 wave, over 68% of West German and 86% of East German households were 
still in the panel. 
German couples marrying for the first time between 1990 and 1995 are selected and 
followed until 2000 to compare household dynamics in the decade following reunification. 
By following new couples over time, we are able to incorporate changes as the marital life 
course progresses. This particular sample is chosen because these individuals were socialized 
under the two different states, but negotiated their married lives under the West German state. 
Couples already married as of 1990 are excluded from analysis, as their inclusion biases 
results with marriages of longer duration and would include East German couples whose 
marriages spanned both state policy structures. Historically, East German couples cohabited 
rather than married at a much greater rate than West German couples, but this difference is 
converging among the younger cohorts (Adler, 2004). As noted above, West German policy 
and law still favors legally married over cohabiting couples with rights varying across the two 
groups. Consequently, the analysis of policy effects here is limited to married couples. 
An indicator variable differentiates couples when the woman and man were educated 
in the former East, yielding samples of 298 West and 50 East couples, a distribution roughly 
representative of the population distribution across the two regions. This proxy captures the 
social environment young people were exposed to while forming their expectations and 
ideologies about women’s and men’s normative roles in society. Further analysis indicates 
that there is little migration across the regions since that time; by the end of the observation 
window, only one couple educated in the East resided in West Germany, and only four West 
German couples resided in East Germany. Eight mixed-region couples were categorized with 
West couples because of the similarities in the averages of their characteristics. Couples are 
followed annually until 2000 unless they divorce or otherwise exit the panel, yielding a total 
analytical sample of 2,142 West and 335 East German couple-years. Subsequent analyses 
suggest that younger, lower-income couples were more likely to have missing data for some 
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of the years that reduces total couple-years in the analysis, but the number of couples 
represented remains constant. Only couples with children are included in the analyses of the 
division of childcare: 248 West and 36 East German couples, yielding 1,840 West and 259 
East German couple-years, 1,809 total after listwise deletion of missing data. Subsequent 
analyses again indicate younger, lower-income parents are more likely to have missing data in 
some years but this does not alter substantive effects. 
Variables 
Four dependent variables cover men’s hours in and share of household tasks and 
childcare. Every year, each member of the household over the age of 16 is asked, “How many 
hours per day do you spend on the following activities? Please give only whole hours. Use 
zero if the activity does not apply.” The activities include “errands (shopping, errands, 
citizen’s duties),” “housework (washing, cooking, cleaning),” “child care,” and “repairs on or 
around the house, car repairs, garden work.” This question is further differentiated depending 
on survey year in terms of “typical weekday,” “typical Saturday,” and “typical Sunday,” 
although only information on typical weekday is gathered every year. A question regarding 
time spent on Saturday and Sunday is asked in survey years 1990, 1993, 1995, 1997, and 
1999. As the information thus varies consistently for couples, no effort was made to 
interpolate weekend time in the interim survey years, particularly as household time varies 
year-to-year for young couples as they form their families and other family circumstances 
change, a supposition confirmed by the within-couple variation reported in Table 2. 
A man’s hours in household tasks are calculated as his reported time spent in 
shopping, errands, citizen’s duties, washing, cooking, cleaning, and repairs on or around the 
house, car repairs, and garden work. I follow Hook (2006) and Lee (2005) in using this 
broader definition of household tasks because all are necessary to successful home production 
and must be negotiated, although the time spent in repairs or gardening tends to be limited to 
weekends and therefore these hours are only included every other year when the question 
regarding weekend time was included in the survey. Husbands in both regions report 
performing slightly more time in gardening and repairs than wives, with time in these tasks 
greater in the East, but these differences are not the primary source of the ones subsequently 
reported. Husband’s share of household tasks is his reported time divided by the summed 
reports from him and his wife, who reports her own hours in these activities. A man’s 
childcare hours are those fathers report, with his share calculated as his reported hours divided 
by the total of his and his wife’s reported childcare hours. These data do not allow for 
estimating simultaneity of childcare with household tasks. 
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Independent individual variables capture relative resources and time availability. The 
German educational system is quite complex, as is the way it is assessed and recorded on the 
German SocioEconomic Panel, comprised of different types of secondary schools leading to 
different postsecondary opportunities and an extensive vocational and technical training 
system. Consequently, a years-of-education variable is not comparable across individuals as 
might be the case in general education systems such as the U.S. Most research suggests it is 
the highest educational attainment associated with different domestic divisions, so two 
indicator variables are created: one each for when the woman or the man has a university 
degree against a referent of less than university, which includes both secondary schooling and 
some technical tertiary schooling. A relative measure in terms of women having more 
education than the man was tried, but proved insignificant. 
After exploring different relative measures, employment effects were assessed using 
each partner’s weekly work hours, along with the wife’s hourly wages. Two interaction terms 
are created to test whether Fuwa’s (2004) employment-related interaction effects are 
replicated with these longitudinal data: one for (East* wives’ weekly employment hours), and 
one for (East* wives’ wages). Ideology measures are not available in these German data, but 
another recent analysis using cross-sectional data finds that ideology varies across the two 
regions but only proves significant in predicting the division of domestic tasks in West 
Germany, with the magnitude of these effects similar for West German women and men 
(Cooke, 2006a). 
Individual control variables include months the couple cohabited prior to marriage, the 
woman’s age at marriage, marriage duration in years, and indicator variables for key age 
groups of the first child and whether the couple had a second child to assess father’s absolute 
and relative time in childcare across the child’s early life as well as across children. An 
additional control for total number of children proved insignificant when modeling effects in 
this way. The child indicators are one for when the first child is younger than two years of age 
and one when the first child is between three and six years of age (as of 1999, maximum 
maternity leave ended early during a child’s third year or 162 weeks), against a referent of 
first children aged 7 to 9, the oldest child in this group of young first-married couples. The 
third indicator is whether the parents had a second child against a referent of having only one 
child. 
Contextual variables include regional unemployment rates, regional female 
employment rates, and the availability of public childcare slots. The regional employment 
data are those published by the Federal Statistical Office for each year of the panel. The 
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number of public childcare slots per 1,000 eligible children under the age of three for each 
year in each Lände is provided by the Deutsches Jugendinstitut in Munich for the years 1991, 
1994, 1998, and 2002. Childcare slots for the interim years were imputed as simple averages 
from the available yearly data. 
Analytic Strategy 
Longitudinal data present special challenges even when used to assess a relatively 
straightforward outcome such as couples’ division of household labor. The repeated annual 
inquiry of the same couple violates assumptions of ordinary least squares regression that 
observations be independent and that error terms not be correlated. Consequently, a random 
effects model using generalized least squares is used here to regress husbands’ hours and 
shares of household tasks, and fathers’ hours and share of childcare on the array of individual 
relative resource, interaction, and contextual variables. Random effects models account for 
the correlation between successive measurements within a given couple, as well as assess 
variation resulting from the independent variables across couples. In other words, they 
separate within-couple changes in the division of domestic tasks over time from differences 
across couples. Unweighted data are used in the analysis, although substantive differences 
when weighting or not are very small. 
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. An equal percentage of East and West 
German women have a university degree (6%), but a larger percentage of East men (16%) 
have a university degree as compared with West German men (11%). Men in both regions 
work comparable full-time hours (40 per week), but a woman’s paid work hours vary across 
regions and her parental status. Women in East Germany work slightly more weekly hours on 
average (18 vs. 15 West German women), and among employed women, East German 
women work longer hours (40 East vs. 37 West). The vast majority of these young couples 
has one or two children and mothers’ weekly work hours are, on average, lower (15 hours 
East, 13 hours West). 
The regional female employment rates converged over the decade to now be only 
slightly greater in the East Länder at 69% as compared with the West at 66%. Not shown is 
how this ranged in 1999 from a low of 57% in the North Rhein-Westfalen region bordering 
France, to a high of 74% in Thüringen, the former East German Lände just north of Bavaria. 
The regional unemployment rates vary more widely, almost 17% in the East as compared with 
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11% in the West. Public childcare for the youngest children also remains more widely 
available in the East, with an average of over 300 places for every 1,000 children younger 
than 3, as compared with fewer than 20 such places in the West Länder. 
These descriptive statistics suggest that East and West German women’s relative 
resources are more similar postunification than before. Women in the two regions also spend 
similar amounts of time in household tasks (25 per week East vs. 27 hours per week West) 
and childcare (34 hours per week in both regions). Despite the current similarity in German 
women’s paid and unpaid labor, East German men spend over four hours more each week on 
household tasks (16 East, 12 West) and two hours more on childcare (11 East, 9 West) even 
though public care is more widely available in the East. These hour differences translate into 
East German men reporting they contribute 39% to household tasks to West German men’s 
30%, with East German fathers’ share of childcare 16% versus 13% among West German 
fathers. Whether these regional differences in men’s average time and share can be explained 
by the subtle differences in women’s employment across the two regions, or in effect derives 
from differences in individual characteristics under time availability or relative resource 
models, is explored next. 
Predicting Husbands’ Household Tasks 
Table 2 displays the main effects of women’s relative resources predicting men’s 
hours in and share of household tasks in the first model, those plus the contextual effect for 
being an East couple in the second model, and the additional interaction effects from being an 
2
East couple and women’s work hours and wages in the third. The R statistics at the bottom of 
the table highlight the insight gained from using longitudinal data to assess couples’ divisions 
of household tasks: 6% of the variation in men’s hours and 14% of the variation in his share 
of household tasks is accounted for by year-to-year changes in the independent variables 
within a given couple, suggesting substantial variation in the factors affecting the division of 
domestic tasks occurs across the marital life course, variation that can only be captured with 
longitudinal data. Another 15% of the variation in men’s household hours and almost one 
third of the variation in men’s household share are accounted for by differences in these 
variables across couples. 
That more variation is explained in men’s share than his hours highlights that some 
variables affect the division of household labor because they predict changes in women’s 
housework hours, not men’s. On the one hand, both spouses’ weekly work hours shift men’s 
hours in domestic tasks, with each additional work hour of the wife predicting her husband 
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will do about four more minutes per week in household tasks (60 minutes x 0.07). On the 
other hand, the husband’s employment hours decrease his predicted housework hours with the 
magnitude of the effect almost twice that of the wife’s work hours (- 0.13 vs. 0.07). Work 
hour effects on his relative share are greater and of more equal (albeit opposite) magnitude, 
suggesting that the primary influence of couples’ employment hours derives from changes in 
women’s housework hours as has been found to be the case in several countries (Gershuny, 
2000). In this first model, the regional female employment rate is the only other independent 
variable that proves significant in predicting both husbands’ hours and share of household 
tasks, and a percentage increase in the female regional employment rate has nearly identical 
effects to an hourly increase in an individual woman’s work hours. These findings concur 
with those claiming the aggregate female employment rate shifts the division of household 
tasks beyond effects of an individual woman’s employment (Breen & Cooke, 2005; Fuwa, 
2004; Hook, 2006). 
Husbands with university degrees spend significantly fewer hours in household tasks 
than less-educated husbands, an effect that becomes insignificant once controlling for wives’ 
hours for predicting his share. This suggests that women married to men with university also 
do fewer hours of household tasks. A wife with a university degree predicts men’s share but 
not his hours will be significantly greater (8 percentage points), again suggesting such women 
spend fewer hours in household tasks than women with less education. Each month the 
couple cohabited prior to marriage predicts a slight decrease in his hours but not his share, 
whereas each percentage point increase in the regional unemployment rate predicts an 
increase in his hours but not his share. The failure of these effects to appear as well in his 
relative share suggest the effect of premarital cohabitation and regional unemployment on 
household hours is similar for women such that the changes disappear when calculating a 
share. As the number of children increases, a man’s hours do not change but his share falls 
significantly, suggesting the woman does all additional household tasks associated with 
having children. 
The second model adds the indicator variable for East couples, which significantly 
improves the fit of the model for men’s hours as well as his share of household tasks. East 
men do almost 4 more weekly hours in household tasks, representing a 12 percentage point 
increase over West German husbands’ share. The effects of each spouse’s work hours remain 
the same, as does the magnitude of university effects, although insignificant effects in the first 
model are now significant. 
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Contextual effects captured by the regional employment rates change. The size of the 
effect of the regional female labor force participation rate dissipates, suggesting these effects 
are stronger in East Germany where women’s employment rates have historically been 
greater. A higher unemployment rate now predicts a significant decline in husband’s share of 
household tasks rather than the increase in his hours predicted in the first model. This 
suggests two things. First, that the positive effect for regional unemployment in the first 
model came from omitted variable bias, in that the unemployment rate is significantly higher 
in East Germany and East German men do more household tasks, so excluding the indicator 
variable for them made these effects appear to be associated with unemployment rather than 
the people living in the area with high unemployment. Second, regional unemployment only 
affects men’s share and is now negative, suggesting that once controlling for East couples, 
where unemployment is high, men do not change their housework hours but women appear to 
increase theirs. Comparing the correlation between the unemployment rate and men’s and 
women’s household hours in the two regions (results not shown), we find a slight but 
insignificant negative association between the unemployment rate and either East or West 
German men’s domestic hours. Only the positive correlation between the unemployment rate 
and West German women’s household hours proves significant. Consequently, where the 
threat of unemployment is higher, West German women spend more hours doing domestic 
tasks. 
The third model adds interaction effects with being educated in the East and women’s 
work hours and wages. The fit of the model does not improve significantly, but both 
interaction terms are significant when predicting a husband’s share but not his hours, 
suggesting these differences work through changes in East wives’ housework hours. On the 
one hand, the interaction of East and women’s work hours is negative and countervails most 
of the main effect of women’s work hours predicting an increase in husband’s share of 
household tasks. As East men’s hours do not increase for this term, the effect suggests 
employed East women do not reduce their housework hours as much as do employed West 
German women. On the other hand, as an East woman’s wages increase, her husband is 
predicted to perform a greater share of housework, although again his actual hours do not 
shift. Controlling for the interactions, an East husband still performs a 13 percentage points 
greater share of household tasks than a West German husband. 
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Predicting Husbands’ Childcare 
As evident from the coefficients presented in Table 3, relative resources regardless of 
context are poor predictors of fathers’ childcare hours or share. As with the analysis of 
household tasks, three models are presented including main effects, then adding contextual 
and then interaction effects, but the latter two do nothing to improve on the main effects 
model. Almost as much variation is explained by changes over time within couples (within R
2 
= 0.21) as by differences across them (between R = 0.28). None of the wives’ resource 
variables proves significant, although a father’s work hours predict he spends less time in 
childcare, with a commensurate drop in his share. As when predicting household tasks, 
controlling for work hours, German fathers with university degrees spend fewer hours in 
childcare than fathers with less education. Additional analyses (not shown) do not find this 
stems from university-educated men having fewer children, so it would seem these men just 
spend fewer hours with the children. As a man’s university degree does not predict any 
difference in his relative share of childcare, this again suggests women married to university-
educated men also spend fewer hours in childcare than women married to less-educated men. 
Fathers spend more time and contribute a greater share when the first child is very 
young as compared to when the child is 7 to 9, the maximum age of any child of these couples 
followed in the first decade of their marriages. Fathers’ time declines slightly when the first 
child is a toddler, whereas his share goes up slightly, suggesting mothers’ childcare time 
declines at this stage in the child’s life. These results concur with those reported in a 2000 
cross-sectional telephone survey, concluding that fathers’ share of childcare increases as the 
children get older (Künzler, Reichart, & Pfister, 2001), but the increase results from mothers 
spending less time in childcare as the children age. The birth of a second child does not 
change a father’s time or share of childcare, a robust effect regardless of whether the second 
child’s age was included in the model (results not shown). As noted in results for household 
tasks, German mothers perform any additional housework associated with having children. 
Among the regional factors, a high unemployment rate predicts that fathers spend 
more time in childcare and contribute a greater share. Unlike with household tasks, however, 
this effect does not alter once including the East couple indicator variable, so it is an effect 
robust across both regions of Germany. Neither the female employment rate nor the 
availability of public childcare alter father’s time or share of childcare. 
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DISCUSSION 
An increasing body of evidence suggests the division of housework varies 
systematically across countries, being slightly more egalitarian where political and labor 
relations are more gender-egalitarian (Davis & Greenstein, 2004; Fuwa, 2004; Hook, 2006). 
We are only beginning to unravel the mechanisms by which this occurs. Baxter (1997) argues 
it is via women’s increasing access to economic resources (main effects), whereas Fuwa 
(2004) finds that greater gender empowerment increases the effect of an individual woman’s 
relative resources (interaction effects). Breen and Cooke (2005) argue that over time, a 
fundamental shift in gender relations occurs beyond the effect of individual resources when 
women as a group are more economically autonomous. This societal situation eventually 
alters men’s beliefs about the desirability of evolving away from separate spheres (contextual 
effects). Therborn (1980) similarly argues material relations over time shape ideology and the 
power derived from it to fuel social revolution. Hook (2006) finds the overall female 
employment rate increases men’s domestic participation regardless of an individual woman’s 
employment, providing evidence of such a contextual effect. 
To explore further the relationship between policy and the division of domestic labor, 
we assessed how couples socialized within two divergent policy settings now negotiate 
household tasks and childcare under the same policy structure. East German policies after 
World War II enhanced women’s relative resources, whereas West German policies 
reinforced a woman’s economic dependence on a male breadwinner. We use longitudinal 
data and select couples marrying between 1990 and 1995 and follow them until 2000 to test 
direct, interaction, and contextual effects on the division of household tasks as well as 
childcare across the two regions now reunified under the West German state. Using the 
longitudinal data reveals that 6% of the variation in household tasks and 21% of the variation 
in childcare is accounted for by changes in the variables within couples over time, 
highlighting the dynamic nature of the division of household labor across the marital life 
course. In fact, the fraction of the variance attributable to changes within a couple over time is 
large as or greater than the cross-country variance reported by Fuwa (2004) or Hook (2006). 
Direct, interaction, and contextual effects all predict significant shifts in the division of 
household tasks, but not necessarily an increase in husbands’ actual hours. Where a factor 
predicts his greater share but no increase in his hours, this indicates the effect derives from 
wives altering their domestic hours. This appears to be the case for paid employment hours, 
women’s education, and the regional employment factors. A wife’s weekly work hours 
increase husband’s weekly housework hours slightly—four minutes per week for each hour 
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she is in paid employment—but predict a larger share. This indicates as others have found that 
employed women decrease their housework hours more than men increase their own to adjust 
to wives’ reduced time availability for domestic tasks. East German employed wives, 
however, reduce their domestic hours less, as the interaction term with wives’ work hours and 
being an East couple was also significant and negative. At the same time, the only significant 
wage effect was again among East German wives’, with wives’ higher wages predicting a rise 
in husbands’ share, but not hours of household tasks. Together these effects suggest that West 
German couples with their higher average wages might be purchasing domestic services as 
women increase their hours in employment, a possibility feasible only among higher-wage 
East German women. An increasing proportion of German couples in both regions utilize 
Buelgelfrau ‘ironing board woman’ and Putzfrau ‘cleaning woman’ from Eastern Europe, 
black-market labor paid very low wages. A similar situation occurs in the United States, 
where well paid women ease the domestic burden by paying lower-skilled women to clean, 
whereas the latter group do not earn enough and so incur the greatest burden of paid and 
unpaid work. This hints that some current equality in the home is gained by leveraging class, 
ethnic, or immigrant inequality, a global trend worthy of future research. 
The regional employment context also shifts the division of household tasks. Greater 
female employment predicts husbands perform a greater share of household tasks, similar to 
the effects found by Hook (2006). This supports Breen and Cooke’s (2005) argument that 
where a greater share of women is economically more independent, men take on a greater 
share of domestic tasks. But here the female employment rate has no effect on men’s actual 
hours, suggesting women living in regions where more women are employed do less 
housework regardless of their actual employment hours. The combined individual, wage, and 
employment rate effects might explain Fuwa’s results that liberal regimes such as Britain and 
Australia show stronger effects of wives’ full-time employment on men’s share of housework 
than the Gender Empowerment Measure would predict. Couples in more advanced 
economies have access to and the ability to pay for market services such as restaurants, 
prepackaged meals, laundries, and so on, to reduce the total amount of domestic tasks to be 
negotiated within the household. So husbands in these liberal regimes might not be 
contributing more hours than husbands in socialist countries, but their relative share appears 
greater because the total household time is less as some services are being purchased from the 
market. The effect of the increasing commodification of domestic tasks under advancing 
industrialization in terms of societal and household divisions of domestic tasks, and what it 
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means for gender as well as other group equality as noted above, are areas not yet explored in 
the comparative literature. 
Higher regional unemployment rates predict a less egalitarian division of domestic 
tasks, after controlling for East couples where the unemployment rate remains generally 
higher. This contextual effect of the macroeconomic environment mirrors Brines’s (1994) 
results found at the individual level where unemployed U.S. husbands contribute a lesser 
share of housework than employed husbands. She interprets this result as evidence of men’s 
“gender display” reinforcing a masculine identity when not performing their normative 
masculine economic role. The subsequent work of Bittman et al. (2003) comparing Australia 
with the United States found the U.S. effect came from men’s reduction in their housework 
hours whereas the Australia effect came from wives’ increasing theirs, suggesting which 
partner in the couple does gender in this way varies in context. To see which gender does 
gender in Germany, we compared the correlation between the unemployment rate and men’s 
and women’s household hours in the two regions. The only significant correlation was a 
positive one between West German women’s domestic hours and the unemployment rate. 
Consequently, West German women, similar to the women in the strong male-breadwinner 
country of Australia, seem to display compensatory domestic behavior when the 
macroeconomic structure threatens the traditional West German male economic role. This 
conclusion is only conjecture, however; we would gain much insight with future cross-
national qualitative research conducted within the home to enable clearer interpretation of 
quantitative results in context. 
University education effects contrast with those found among U.S. couples. A German 
wife with university predicts her husband’s greater share of household tasks as found for the 
United States, but in contrast to U.S. findings, a German husband with university spends 
fewer hours and devotes a lesser share to household tasks than husbands with less education. 
The U.S. men’s university effect is often interpreted as an education effect on his ideology 
(Shelton & John, 1996), but the German results suggest that higher education does not 
necessarily impart gender egalitarian ideals. Although university education was the historical 
purview of the male elite in many societies, U.S. women attained higher levels of education 
far earlier than their German counterparts. By 1880, one out of every three undergraduates in 
U.S. universities and colleges was female (Sklar, 1993), a proportion of women in university 
that would not be reached in East or West Germany until the 1970s. Today, a greater 
proportion of all U.S. secondary school graduates go on to university than in Germany, and a 
larger share of the youngest cohort of U.S. women as compared with men attain at least 
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tertiary education whereas in Germany, a larger share of the youngest cohort of men still does 
(OECD, 2002). Consequently, in comparative work it is important to assess what gender 
ideology a country’s higher education system might reinforce and not assume it is always an 
egalitarian one. Future research might explore what structure of education (general education 
as in Australia, Great Britain, or the U.S. as compared with more stratified systems as in 
Germany or the Netherlands), content, or course of study, and proportion of women with 
university education predict more egalitarian ideology for either women or men along with 
the degree of equity in both paid and unpaid labor. 
Once accounting for the various individual and regional effects, East husbands spend 
over four hours more per week in household tasks, and their share is over 13 percentage 
points greater than West German husbands’. Clearly, then, in the decade following 
reunification, convergence in the two regions did not materialize despite the depressed labor 
market conditions and new challenges being faced by East German couples. These results 
highlight that policy effects on the gendered division of paid labor fundamentally alter gender 
relations in the home, a point argued from a bargaining perspective by Breen and Cooke 
(2005) and from an ideological perspective by Therborn (1980). Female employment and 
men’s share of domestic tasks, however, are almost as high in the United States as in East 
Germany (Fuwa, 2004, p. 757). In contrast to East Germany, U.S. policy remains basically 
silent on the private sphere while simultaneously giving market forces perhaps the greatest 
rein of all industrialized countries. This pattern of findings suggests that policies or pure 
market dynamics can both lead to more egalitarian divisions of domestic tasks. Future work 
might compare and contrast market versus state effects on encouraging greater equity. 
What cannot be differentiated in the analyses here is whether convergence is occurring 
over time for the two regional populations stemming from a confluence of competing effects 
that the selected sample does not incorporate. Here we observe only couples marrying in the 
early 1990s and follow them for a decade, not all cohorts of couples marrying since 
reunification. As young people become socialized for more of their lives under West German 
policies, greater convergence might be apparent in couples marrying since 2000, for example, 
than in the prior decade. At the same time, West Germany is evolving as well. Numerous 
legal restrictions on West German women’s employment participation were eliminated 
beginning in the late 1970s, so ideological power derived from these new material relations 
would alter West German gender relations as it had East German under former socialist 
policies, only later in historical time. More recent European Union gender mainstreaming 
objectives and court decisions have also forced West German policies to move still further 
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away from a male breadwinner model and instead codify greater gender equity (Tons & 
Young, 2001). Consequently, greater regional convergence might occur not because the 
egalitarianism of East Germany wanes, but because egalitarianism in West Germany waxes. 
The preliminary analysis of the 2002 International Social Survey Program noted earlier 
suggests such convergence pressures from both sides; East German men report slightly more 
support for separate spheres in 2002 than they did in 1994, but East German women and West 
German men and women report more egalitarian attitudes. More waves of longitudinal data 
and cohort analyses controlling for policy changes will be needed to explore German 
convergence patterns in more detail. 
The study here is also limited in that it analyzes married couples, whereas an 
increasing proportion of young German couples choose cohabitation in lieu of marriage 
(Adler, 2004). Most research comparing cohabiting with legally married couples finds 
differences in the division of domestic labor, but none to date has compared the extent to 
which these might be selection effects (e.g., who chooses to cohabit versus marry) or 
contextual effects on relative power. Many state policies differentiate between de facto and de 
jure couples, and even differentiate between de facto couples. For example, married and 
cohabiting couples in Australia must include their partner’s income to determine benefit 
entitlement, unless they happen to be same-gender cohabiting couples. The complex ways in 
which policy discriminates or reinforces family assumptions and affects relative gender power 
under changing demographics remains a vastly under-researched area. 
Among the German couples, contextual effects do not apply unilaterally to all 
domestic tasks. The second key finding here is that the division of childcare is not amenable 
to modeling with relative resource variables. Men’s hours and share of childcare are highest 
when the first child is younger than two years of age; his hours decline a bit and his share 
increases as children grow older. German men’s hours and share in childcare are also 
appreciably less than their contribution to other domestic tasks. These findings suggest that in 
both German regions, responsibility for children remains the purview of women. 
What cannot be ascertained with these data is whether this reflects maternal 
gatekeeping among German mothers or resistance of German fathers to devoting more hours 
with their children. Allen and Hawkins (1999) find that among U.S. dual-earner couples a 
substantial minority (21%) of mothers are active gatekeepers of fathers’ access to the children. 
Sayer also found that the U.S. gender gap in housework had closed further than the gap in 
childcare. In 1998, women’s to men’s relative time in housework had shrunk to 1.4, whereas 
U.S. women retained childcare at a proportion of 2.2 (Sayer, 2005, p. 292). Using the means 
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reported in Table 1, equivalent proportions in East Germany are 1.6 for household tasks and 
3.2 for childcare, whereas in West Germany, domestic tasks remain most gendered at 2.3 for 
household tasks and 4.0 for childcare. The policy reinforcement of women’s domestic 
responsibility encouraging maternal gatekeeping appears more acute in Germany than in the 
United States. Until 1977, West German women’s responsibility for the home and children 
was a legal duty. The Mommy Politics of the East German maternal support provisions also 
reinforced women’s responsibility for childcare (Ferree, 1993). We need to explore further 
with more suitable data policy as well as cultural differences in maternal gatekeeping, in 
conjunction with fathers’ possible resistance to adopting more of the caring role. 
Finding persistent policy effects is an exciting indication of how the state shapes 
gender relations, but the above proportions also highlight that gendered divisions persist, just 
to varying degrees. This pattern points to another limitation of the research in that policy 
comprises just one contextual effect. Other important effects derive from organized religion or 
rural versus urban living or whether the respondent is an immigrant from another culture in 
the host country, none of which are modeled here and can countermand even progressive 
policy. Only when including measures of a range of institutional effects on the gendered 
division of labor can we more confidently assert the extent to which bargaining models or the 
gender perspective appear to explain modern gender relations. 
Finally, we should extend contextual analyses of the household division of labor to 
explore not only sociopolitical effects on the division, but effects of varying divisions on 
other family outcomes. Some evidence indicates that Hungarian men’s greater involvement in 
housework and Swedish men’s taking of parental leave both increase the likelihood a couple 
will have a second child (Oláh, 2003), whereas traditional and egalitarian U.S. couples are 
both more likely to (Torr & Short, 2004). Other evidence suggests the effect of equity on 
relationship stability varies in context. Cooke (2006b) finds in West Germany where policy 
supported a male breadwinner model, any movement away from gender specialization in 
terms of wives’ relative earnings or husbands’ relative housework increases the risk of 
divorce. In contrast, equitable distributions of the household division of labor predicted under 
social exchange models prove optimal in the United States where policy remains silent on the 
private sphere. Much more comparative research is needed to understand better the ways in 
which policy and the market together shape our gender identities, and the implications of 
these on family forms and outcomes in postindustrial societies. 
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TABLE 1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EAST AND WEST GERMAN FIRST-MARRIED COUPLES 
(N = 348 COUPLES, 284 COUPLES WITH CHILDREN) 
East German Couples West German Couples 
M SD M SD 
Wife’s work hours 18.27 21.08 15.01 19.38 
When wife employed 40.26 9.58 36.57 11.23 
When a mother 15.12 20.14 12.57 18.38 
Wife’s wages (DM) 7.78 10.04 7.94 11.55 
Husband’s work hours 40.37 16.41 40.06 15.06 
Husband’s hours household tasks 16.23 10.13 11.71 9.53 
Wife’s hours household tasks 25.21 13.99 26.60 14.23 
Husband’s share household tasks 39.21 17.54 29.65 19.52 
Father’s hours childcare 10.53 14.55 8.45 11.82 
Mother’s hours childcare 33.87 30.65 33.78 31.95 
Father’s share childcare 16.29 19.33 12.76 15.90 
Wife with university .06 .24 .06 .23 
Husband with university .16 .37 .11 .32 
Wife’s age at marriage 23.50 2.77 24.30 3.86 
Duration of marriage 7.51 2.01 7.98 2.15 
Number of children 1.25 .83 1.43 .83 
Months cohabited before marriage 9.68 14.63 11.05 17.32 
Regional unemployment rate 16.68 2.48 10.90 1.62 
Regional female employment rate 69.09 5.60 66.40 6.64 
Public childcare/1000 children 0 - 3 310.52 176.10 18.78 32.21 
Note: Total sample represents N = 2,188 couple-years, childcare hours and share represents N 
= 1,809 couple-years with children. These descriptive statistics represent averages over the 
observed marital life course of these first marriages during the 1990s, not a cross-section of 
German couples. During the observation period, 13 East German and 93 West German 
couples divorced, or approximately 4% of each sample. 
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TABLE 2. RANDOM EFFECTS GENERALIZED LEAST SQUARES MAIN, INTERACTION, AND CONTEXTUAL EFFECTS PREDICTING GERMAN HUSBANDS’ 
HOURS IN AND SHARE OF HOUSEHOLD TASKS (N = 2,118 COUPLE-YEARS FOR 348 COUPLES) 
No East Effects East Main Effect East Interactions

Men’s Hours Men’s Share Men’s Hours Men’s Share Men’s Hours Men’s Share 
Variable B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE 
Wife’s weekly work hours .07*** .02 .28*** .03 .07*** .02 .26*** .03 .07*** .02 .29*** .03 
Husband’s weekly work hours - .13*** .01 - .23*** .03 - .13*** .01 - .23*** .03 - .13*** .01 - .23*** .03 
Wife’s hourly wages - .01 .03 .09* .05 - .01 .03 .11* .05 - .01 .03 .08 .05 
Wife with university
a 
2.79 1.49 8.28** 2.86 3.03* 1.49 8.97** 2.84 3.04 1.49 9.00** 2.84 
Husband with university
a 
- 4.14*** 1.09 - 3.74 2.09 - 4.51*** 1.09 - 4.88* 2.08 - 4.53*** 1.10 - 5.10** 2.09 
Wife’s age at marriage .16 .10 .19 .19 .18 .10 .25 .18 .18 .10 .26 .18 
Duration of marriage (years) .07 .15 - .08 .29 .08 .15 - .08 .29 .07 .15 - .07 .29 
Number of children - .57 .42 - 2.41** .80 - .52 .42 - 2.29** .79 - .52 .42 - 2.30** .79 
Months cohabited before marriage - .05* .02 - .02 .04 - .05* .02 - .02 .04 - .05* .02 - .02 .04 
Regional unemployment rate (%) .33** .10 .14 .20 .01 .15 - .79** .27 .02 .15 - .76** .27 
Regional female employment rate (%) .08** .03 .25*** .06 .04 .03 .12* .06 .04 .03 .12* .06 
b
Wife and husband educated in East 3.92** 1.31 12.11*** 2.45 4.05** 1.39 13.01*** 2.58 
East*wife’s work hours - .01 .05 - .21** .08 
East*wife’s hourly wages .00 .09 .34* .16 
Constant 4.67 3.90 17.08* 7.40 10.15* 4.30 33.29*** 8.05 10.06* 4.31 32.52*** 8.07 
2
Within R .06 .14 .06 .15 .06 .15 
2
Between R .15 .31 .15 .33 .15 .33 
2
Overall R .11 .23 .11 .24 .11 .24 
Rho .26 .30 .26 .30 .26 .30 
Wald χ-square 171.09*** 445.45*** 180.63*** 475.68*** 180.61*** 482.47*** 
a b
Education: 0 = less than university, 1 = university. East couple: 0 = West couple, 1 = East couple. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. (two-tailed tests) 
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TABLE 3. RANDOM EFFECTS GENERALIZED LEAST SQUARES MAIN, INTERACTION, AND CONTEXTUAL EFFECTS PREDICTING GERMAN FATHERS’ 
HOURS IN AND SHARE OF CHILDCARE (N = 1,809 COUPLE-YEARS FOR 284 COUPLES) 
No East Effects East Main Effect East Interactions 
Men’s Hours Men’s Share Men’s Hours Men’s Share Men’s Hours Men’s Share 
Variable B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE 
Wife’s weekly work hours - .03 .02 - .01 .03 - .03 .02 - .01 .036 - .04 .02 - .04 .03 
Husband’s weekly work hours - .15*** .02 - .17*** .03 - .15*** .02 - .17*** .03 - .15*** .02 - .17*** .02 
Wife’s hourly wages (DM) - .05 .03 .02 .04 - .05 .03 .02 .04 - .04 .04 .01 .05 
Wife with university
a 
.04 1.81 1.79 2.51 .08 1.82 1.81 2.51 .00 1.81 1.41 2.50 
Husband with university
a 
- 2.70* 1.21 - .32 1.69 - 2.76* 1.23 - .33 1.71 - 2.63* 1.23 - .15 1.70 
Wife’s age at marriage .22 .12 .13 .16 .22 .12 .13 .16 .21 .12 .14 .16 
Duration of marriage (years) .10 .18 .39 .25 .09 .18 .39 .25 .10 .18 .40 .24 
Months cohabited before marriage - .02 .02 - .06 .03 - .02 .02 - .06 .03 - .02 .02 - .06 .03 
Regional unemployment rate (%) .48** .18 .92*** .23 .45* .21 .91*** .27 .44* .21 .85** .27 
Regional female employment rate (%) .07 .05 .05 .06 .07 .05 .05 .06 .07 .05 .05 .06 
b
First child age 0 to 2 9.38*** .71 12.53*** .91 9.40*** .72 12.55*** .92 9.35*** .71 12.47*** .92 
First child age 3 to 6
c 
8.83*** .73 13.18*** .93 8.86*** .73 13.21*** .94 8.77*** .73 12.98*** .94 
d
Whether a second child .34 .77 .69 1.00 .34 .77 .69 1.00 .36 .77 .74 1.00 
Public childcare/1000 children 0 to 3 - .00 .00 - .00 .01 - .00 .01 - .00 .01 - .00 .01 - .01 .01 
Wife and husband educated in East 
e 
.53 2.19 .22 2.96 - .08 2.24 - 1.92 3.02 
East*wife’s work hours .11 .07 .10 .09 
East*wife’s hourly wages - .12 .13 .17 .16 
Constant - 4.66 5.34 - 6.27 7.08 - 4.20 5.62 - 6.03 7.40 - 3.86 5.62 - 5.29 7.37 
2
Within R .21 .23 .21 .23 .21 .23 
2
Between R .28 .29 .28 .29 .29 .30 
2
Overall R .22 .25 .22 .25 .22 .25 
Rho .17 .22 .17 .21 .16 .21 
Wald χ-square 498.70*** 561.42*** 498.67*** 561.43*** 502.47*** 576.34*** 
a b c d
Education: 0 = less than university, 1 = university. First child age: 0 = older than 6, 1 = age 0 to 2. First child age: 0 = older than 6, 1 = age 3 to 6. Second child: 0 = no, 1 
e
= yes. East couple: 0 = West couple, 1 = East couple. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. (two-tailed tests) 
